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1.  Introduction 
 
The first goal of this paper is to pursue a uniform formal semantic analysis of different 
uses of the French conditionnel morphology, so named for its use in the main clause of 
counterfactual (aka remote or subjunctive) conditionals. 
 
(1)  S’il n’était pas linguiste, il serait comédien.  
  ‘If he were not an actor, he would be an actor.’  
 
  It is possible to analyze the morphology as composed of future and perfective mor-
phoogy (see Iatridou (2000)); however for the purpose of analyzing its interaction with 
certain modals and attitude predicates, I will treat it as a unit. I will also assume differ-
ences in person and number (je mangerais ‘I would eat’; ils mangeraient ‘they would 
eat’) to be orthogonal.  
 
  The second goal will be an analysis of the related phenomena in English, including  
the morphologically preterite forms of modals (should, ought to, might and could) and  
the attitude verb wish. 
 
  Section 2 argues that the core shared meaning of the conditionnel is its possible 
counterfactuality. In the analysis proposed, should, for example, is a necessity modal em-
bedded under a counterfactual operator like would. Section 3 proposes an account of the 
difference in meaning between, for example, should and would have to, based on certain 
characteristic discourse properties. 
 
2.   (Possible) Counterfactuality  
2.1   Epistemic doit and devrait 
 
Copley  (2005)  presents  a  contrast  between  epistemic  must  and  should  (see  English 
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glosses)  which  appears  also  to  obtain  in  French.  French  devrait  and  English  ought 
to/should are felicitous with a continuation that the speaker is ignorant of the truth of the 
embedded proposition (henceforth “prejacent”), while the same continuation following 
have to/must ‘doit’ is infelicitous, or at least more marked in comparison. 
 
(2)  a. # La bière doit être froide maintenant, mais je n’ai aucune idée si c’est le cas. 
 # ‘The beer has to/must be cold by now, but I have absolutely no idea if it is.’ 
  b. La bière devrait être froide maintenant, mais je n’ai aucune idée si c’est le cas.  
      ‘The beer ought to/should be cold by now but I have no idea if it is.’  
 
  The same contrast holds for a continuation in which the speaker denies the truth of  
the prejacent.  
 
(3)  a. # La bière doit être froide maintenant, mais elle ne l’est pas.  
     # ‘The beer has to/must be cold by now, but it’s not.’ 
  b. La bière devrait être froide maintenant, mais elle ne l’est pas.  
      ‘The beer ought to/should be cold by now, but it’s not’ 
 
  Note that reordering the conjuncts does not remove the infelicity.  
 
(4)  # Je n’ai aucune idée si la bière est froide, mais elle doit l’être maintenant.  
  #‘I have absolutely no idea if the beer is cold, but it has to/must be by now.’ 
 
(5)  # La bière n’est pas froide, mais elle doit l’être maintenant.  
  # ‘The beer isn’t cold, but it has to/must be by now.’ 
 
  Following Kratzer (1981, 1991), epistemic have to/must has an epistemic modal 
base,  consisting  of  all  possible  worlds  consistent  with  the  speaker’s  knowledge  (e.g. 
worlds in which the speaker put beer in the fridge three hours ago), and a stereotypical 
ordering source, consisting of worlds that follow the normal course of events (e.g. worlds 
in which putting items in a fridge causes them to chill within a certain period of time). I 
assert must p because all my evidence tells me that p; therefore, it is unsurprising that the 
continuation I have absolutely no idea whether p is infelicitous. And asserting both must 
p and not p, Copley argues, amounts to a case of Moore’s paradox: p and I don’t believe 
that p. Epistemic doit and have to/must behave as expected. The utterances with devrait 
and ought to/should, in comparison, are perfectly acceptable.
1 
 
  The contrast also holds for the past forms of the modals (i.e. with perfect avoir 
‘have’). Suppose we are attending a day-long workshop at a windowless venue. I haven’t 
left the building all day, but remember that the forecast was calling for quite a lot of rain 
and the sky was full of dark stormclouds. At the end of the day, I walk outside only to 
discover that the grass and pavement are bone dry. Uttering (6a) is infelicitous, while (6b) 
is quite natural.  
                                                 
1 See also relevant discussion in Werner (2005). In Werner’s analysis, must entails will according 
to a hierarchy of ordering sources; by stipulation, ought to/should lies outside of the hierarchy. 
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(6)  a. # Il a dû pleuvoir, mais il n’a pas plu.  
# ‘It must/has to have rained, but it didn’t.’ 
  b. ‘Il aurait dû pleuvoir, mais il n’a pas plu.  
          ‘It should/must have rained, but it didn’t.’  
 
(6a) is another case of Moore’s paradox: it asserts both that I know that it didn’t rain and 
that among all the worlds consistent with my knowledge right now the closest stereotypi-
cal worlds are those in which it rained in the past.
2 
 
  Since it is only the conditionnel morphology which distinguishes the French forms  
doit and devrait, and a dû and aurait dû, we will therefore pursue the hypothesis that the 
conditionnel (and something analogous in English) is responsible for this contrast. 
 
2.2   Deontic doit and devrait 
 
Ninan (2005) observes a similar contrast between deontic must and should, which also 
holds between French doit and devrait. In virtue of Sam’s sins, Sam’s mother utters one 
of the following:  
 
(7)  a. # Sam doit se rendre à la confession, mais il n’y va pas.  
     # ‘Sam has to/must go to confession, but he’s not going to.’ 
  b. Sam devrait se rendre à la confession, mais il n’y va pas.  
            ‘Sam ought to/should go to confession, but he’s not going to.’ 
 
  The apparent infelicity of doit and have to/must persists despite reordering of con-  
juncts or change of person. 
 
(8)  # Sam ne se rend pas à la confession, mais il doit le faire.  
  # ‘Sam isn’t going to go to confession, but he has to/must.’  
 
(9)  # Je dois me rendre à la confession, mais je n’y vais pas.  
  # ‘I have to/must go to confession, but I’m not going to.’ 
 
  In Section 2.1, we found epistemic must and doit well behaved and epistemic ought 
to/should and devrait aberrant. Here, it seems at first that the situation is reversed. Since 
obligations can and often do go unfulfilled, we can imagine a possible world in which 
Sam has to go to confession and Sam isn’t going to go to confession are both true. In-
deed, Kratzer’s analysis of deontic necessity is motivated by this potential conflict be-
tween what is required and what actually obtains. We analyze must or have to in this case 
with a modal base of worlds consistent with the circumstances (viz. Sam has committed 
sins) and an ordering source of worlds consistent with religious or moral norms (viz. sin-
ners confess their sins). Sam doit se rendre à la confession can be true even if the modal 
base does not contain worlds in which Sam follows religious norms and goes to confes-
                                                 
2 Here I assume that an epistemic modal scopes above the perfect operator; see Iatridou (1991), 
Abusch (1997), Stowell (2004) and Hacquard (2006) for discussion. 
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sion. In other words, we do not expect an infelicity. Ought to/should behaves as expected. 
It is must (and have to) which, according to Ninan, requires special treatment. Ninan’s 
move  is  to  introduce  epistemic  content  into  the  semantics  of  must—but  not  ought 
to/should. Rather than a circumstantial modal base, must would have an epistemic modal 
base and thus, just as we saw above for epistemic modals, the infelicity of examples like 
(7a) are reduced to a variation of Moore’s paradox: in the first conjunct of (7a) Sam’s 
mother implies that she does not know whether he will go to confession (her epistemic 
alternatives include both worlds in which he goes to confession and worlds in which he 
does not), yet in the second conjunct she asserts that he will not.  
 
  While the similarity of this account of deontic necessity to Copley’s account of  
epistemic necessity is certainly striking, I’m not sure it is necessary to posit an epistemic 
modal base for deontic modals in order to maintain the symmetry. Given the non omnis-
cience of a speaker, it seems plausible that a circumstantial modal base (the set of worlds 
consistent with the circumstances in the world of evaluation) must almost certainly be 
relative to the speaker and/or speech participants. A modal uttered by one of Galileo’s 
contemporaries, for example, would arguably not have a modal base of worlds consistent 
with the world being round. The advantage of positing a circumstantial modal base is that 
we don’t have to treat deontic doit and have to/must as special. All the deontic modals 
have a circumstantial modal base, and we can again ask why devrait and ought to/should  
behave differently with respect to Moore's paradox and what it is about the semantics of 
the conditionnel that gives rise to this behavior. 
 
  Turning to the past forms, English have to and must lack a deontic interpretation 
entirely  (cf.  (10a))  which  is  available  with  (and  even  the  most  natural  reading  of) 
should/ought to have. Ninan argues that the unavailability of the deontic reading is ruled 
out pragmatically: we cannot require that someone bring about a past event. Since the 
relative scope of have to/must and past have is fixed, the reading in which an obligation 
held in the past is also not available. The PAST > NEC deontic reading is, however, avail-
able for English had to and French a dû. Like the present forms, this reading too implies
3 
that the prejacent obtained, e.g. that Sam did in fact go to confession; English ought 
to/should and French devoir with the conditionnel in French again allow a reading in 
which the prejacent did not obtain. 
 
(10)  a. Sam a dû se rendre à la confession.  
      (i)   #‘Sam must/has to have gone to confession.’  
      (ii)    ‘Sam had to go to confession.’  
  b. Sam aurait dû se rendre à la confession.  
      ‘Sam should/ought to have gone to confession.’  
 
2.3  Propositional Attitude Verbs veut and voudrait 
 
Heim (1992) observed what I will argue to be the same contrast for English want and 
wish, a contrast which also holds between the related French verbs veut and voudrait. In 
                                                 
3 Hacquard (2006) shows that in French the actuality is entailed. 
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(11) based on Heim’s example, we get the strong impression in (b) that Karin believes it 
very unlikely or impossible that her husband will teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays.  
 
(11)  a. Karin veut que son mari enseigne les mardis et les jeudis.  
      ‘Karin wants her husband to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays.’  
  b. Karin voudrait que son mari enseigne les mardis et les jeudis.  
     ‘Karin’s husband wishes that her husband would teach Tuesdays and Thursdays.’  
 
  The modal base is again doxastic: the set of worlds consistent with the speaker’s 
belief;  the ordering source is buletic, consisting of worlds in which the speaker’s desires 
are  met.
4 Consider a truly impossible prejacent, one in which time stands still (example  
adapted from Heim).  
 
(12)  a. # Je veux que ce weekend continue pour toujours.  
     # ‘I want this weekend to last forever.’  
  b.  Je voudrais que ce weekend continue pour toujours.  
      ‘I wish this weekend would last forever.’ 
 
While some speakers may not reject (12a) outright, Heim suggests that there is an impor-
tant sense in which the speaker of (12a) admits the impossibility of realizing her desire 
and the speaker of (12b) does not, perhaps in a metaphorical or schizophrenic way: “The 
reasonable part of me knows and is resigned to the fact that time passes, but the primitive 
creature of passion has lost sight of it” (200).  
 
  We arrive at another variant of Moore’s Paradox, since there are, for any rational  
speaker, no doxastic alternatives in which a weekend lasts forever, and veut or want  
assert that the most desirable belief worlds are worlds in which the weekend lasts  
forever. Voudrais and wish are not paradoxical; therefore, they must be able to  
quantify over counterfactual worlds.  
 
  Since there are also syntactic di want and wish—the former takes an infinitival 
complement and the latter a finite complement with subjunctive morphology, it is worth 
noting that the semantic contrast in French exists independently of the syntactic category 
of the complement. The prejacent of (12) is finite; in (13), it is infinitival.  
 
(13)  a. # Je veux être enceinte. [uttered by a man]  
      # ‘I want to be pregnant.’  
  b. Je voudrais être enceinte. [uttered by a man]  
      ‘I wish I were pregnant.’ 
 
2.4 Epistemic peut and pourrait  
 
While epistemic peut and may often appear interchangeable with pourrait and might, re-
spectively, many speakers intuit a difference in tentativeness or remoteness (see Palmer 
                                                 
4 Heim’s original proposal was set in a dynamic framework but the spirit is, I believe, the same. 
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(1979, 1986) and Huddleston (2002) for English). 
 
(14)  a. Vous pouvez avoir raison.  
      ‘You may be right.’  
  b. Vous pourriez avoir raison.  
      ‘You might be right.’  
 
  It is also possible to find counterfactual examples which distinguish the two. Sup-
pose we are in a game preserve located in France with African animals in a desert-like 
landscape. We know that we are still in France, but nearly all of the evidence available 
would suggest that we are in Africa.  
 
(15)  a. # On peut être en Afrique. [uttered in France]  
 # ‘We may be in Africa.’  
  b. On pourrait être en Afrique. [uttered in France]  
       ‘We might/could be in Africa.’         (English data from Huddleston (2002))  
 
  English might have and could have have received much more attention (cf. Con-
doravdi  (2001),  Stowell  (2004)).  Both  may/can  have  and  a  pu  on  the  one  hand  and 
might/could have and aurait pu on the other allow a present epistemic reading about a 
past event. Both (16a) and (16b) have readings on which it is now an epistemic possibil-
ity that Jules won in the past, with apparent scope POSS>PAST. What (16b) has that (16a) 
lacks is a reading in which there was a past possibility that Jules would win, even if we 
now know that he did not in fact win. 
 
(16)  a. Jules a pu gagné.  
     ‘Jules can/may have won.’  
  b. Jules aurait pu gagner.  
     ‘Jules could/might have won’      (English data modified from Condoravdi 2001)  
 
Could/might have and aurait pu appear to contradict the generalization that epistemic 
modals cannot generally be interpreted below past tense (cf. fn 2). Condoravdi (2001) 
and others are therefore lead to introduce a metaphysical, historical or counterfactual mo-
dal base. Following our reasoning above, however, if we can consider the evidence in 
counterfactual  worlds,  worlds  in  which  things  turned  out  differently,  the  evidence  in 
those worlds is in fact consistent with Jules’s winning. In (6b), we were able to overlook 
our knowledge of it having in fact rained; in (16b), we ignore our knowledge of Jules 
having won.  
 
2.5 Deontic peut and pourrait 
 
  A similar difference in tentativeness/remoteness and sometimes politeness is ob-
served between deontic peut and can, and pourrait and can. 
 
(17)  a. Pouvez-vous passer le sel?  
      ‘Can you pass the salt?’  
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  b. Pourriez -vous passer le sel?  
      ‘Could you pass the salt?’  
 
  Ninan (2005) argues that one cannot require someone to bring about past events. It 
should be equally odd to give permission that someone bring about a past event, ruling 
out the scope POSS>PAST. The opposite interpretation is ruled out in English by its fixed 
scope, but is available in French. In fact, there is an actuality entailment in French: in 
(18a) you did in fact do the dishes. (18a) asserts that there is at least one closest norma-
tive  belief  world  in  which  I  did  the  dishes;  it  is  therefore  Moore-paradoxical  if  the 
speaker believes that you did not do the dishes. In (18b), however, both the French and 
English versions are consistent with your not having done the dishes. Note that (18b) is 
also special in that it seems stronger than mere permission. Huddleston (2002) suggests 
that  a  kind  of  pragmatic  strengthening  is  present  in  such  examples  (see  also  Palmer 
(1979:159) and von Fintel and Gillies (2007:fn.4)).  
 
(18)  a. Vous avez pu faire la vaisselle.  
      # ‘You can/may have done the dishes.’ 
     ‘You were permitted to do the dishes.’  
  b. Vous auriez pu faire la vaisselle! 
      ‘You could/might have done the dishes!’  
     (English data modified from Huddleston 2002) 
 
2.6 Counterfactual if necessary, but not necessarily counterfactual  
 
As advertised, we want to pursue an analysis which takes the conditionnel to be a  
modal in its own right. Our starting point is Kratzer’s (1981, seq) analysis of would  
with an ‘empty’ modal base and ‘totally realistic’ ordering source. It is this modal which 
gives us the worlds of evaluation for an embedded modal, if any.  
 
  This is perhaps a good point at which to stress that purpose of this section has not 
been to show that all instances of modals with the conditionnel are counterfactual, i.e. 
that the modal force of the embedded modal never holds in the actual world. Rather, the 
worlds of evaluation are possibly, but not necessarily, counterfactual. We’ve known since 
at  least  Anderson  (1951)  that  morphologically  “counterfactual”  conditionals  are  not 
strictly counterfactual in the sense that the prejacent is false. In (19), for instance, the pre-
jacent of would is explicitly asserted to hold in the actual world.  
 
(19)  If Jones had taken arsenic, he would be showing just exactly those symptoms he 
does in fact show.  (Anderson 1951) 
 
All possible worlds (modulo implicit or explicit restriction) are ordered according to their 
similarity to the evaluation world. Although an implicature of nonactuality may arise by 
competition of would p and its nonmodal counterpart p (a Gricean maxim of informative-
ness would militate towards simple p if the speaker is in a position to know that p is true), 
nothing in the semantics of would asserts nonactuality.  
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3. Modal Specific Indefinites  
3.1 Distinguishing properties 
 
In a review of French and other languages in which the meaning of ‘should’ is derived 
from a necessity modal and counterfactual morphology, von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) 
rightly observe that English ought to/should does not mean the same as would have to. 
The authors take this as evidence that ought to/should is not a necessity modal embedded 
under a counterfactual modal. However, we’ve now considered lots of evidence suggest-
ing that it is. What we require, then, is an account of this meaning difference. Let’s begin 
by considering some distinguishing properties of so-called “transparent” interpretations 
(cf. would have to) and “opaque” interpretations (cf. should).  
 
  Perhaps the most salient difference is felicity in out-of-the-blue contexts. Should-
type readings can be used in out-of-the-blue contexts; would have to-type readings can-
not. Suppose you are at some social function where most people are strangers. You find 
yourself standing by a man you don’t know. (20a) is a natural opener; (20b) is decidedly 
odd.  
 
(20)  Bonsoir, monsieur. Je devrais me presenter.  
  a. ‘Good evening, sir. I should introduce myself.  
  b. ‘Good evening, sir. I would have to introduce myself. 
 
The would have to reading is only appropriate if some remote/counterfactual worlds have 
been evoked. In (21) this is achieved via negation.  
 
(21)  Je suis heureux qu’on n’est pas dans une classe. Je devrais me presenter.  
‘I’m glad we’re not in some class. I would have to introduce myself.’ 
 
  Not only do possibly counterfactual worlds have to be evoked for the would have to  
reading,  they  must  be  available  to  all  speech  participants.  Or  at  least  a  cooperative 
speaker must expect that such worlds are available to the listener (i.e. they are in the 
common ground). It is not sufficient for the reading (20b), for example, that either the 
speaker or the listener have possibly counterfactual worlds in mind. The speaker must 
believe that both she and the listener have access to them as well.  
 
  This discourse constraint on the should-type reading is not the same; the should- 
type allows a speaker-listener asymmetry. Suppose you have invited me to your dinner 
party, and that as I am about to leave at the end of the evening, I notice quite a significant 
mess in the kitchen. Given the circumstances, and the norms associated with being a po-
lite and considerate guest, I utter one of the following. 
 
(22)  a. Je dois vous aider.  
     ‘I have to/must help you.’  
  b. Je devrais vous aider  
      (i)  ‘I ought to/should help you.’  
      (ii) ‘I would have to help you.’ 
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(22a) is quite insistent: helping you is the only option and so help you, I will. In (22b) I 
allow for other options. It may be that I have such worlds in mind: perhaps you do not 
trust me with your china; perhaps I am due to pick up Aunt Hilda from the airport from 
her red-eye flight. Or, it may be that I am leaving it open for you to identify certain 
worlds: perhaps your dishes came from the caterer’s; perhaps you are really tired and just 
want me to leave so that you can go to bed.  
 
  Finally, both the would have to- and should-type readings are felicitous with an ir-
realis if-clause restrictor. In the English would have to reading, it seems the modal force 
of the embedded modal holds over all of the counterfactual worlds; in the should reading, 
the modal force holds in some but not all of the counterfactual worlds. The English gloss 
of (23b) is inconsistent with the continuation ‘but he would not have to’: in all of the 
counterfactual police-officer worlds, he must arrest us. This same continuation is natural 
with gloss (23a): in some but not necessarily all of the counterfactual police-worlds does 
he have to arrest us.  
 
(23)  S’il y avait un policier ici, il devrait nous arrêter.  
  a. ‘If there were a police officer, he should arrest us.’  
  b. ‘If there were a police officer would have to arrest us.’  
 
3.2 Quantification and discourse 
 
Let us suppose, then, that the conditionnel on its would have to-type reading has universal 
force, on analogy with the universal determiner all and the conditionnel on its should-
type reading has existential force, like the determiner some. This analysis has a precedent 
in Klinedinst (2007), who argues that all weak/possibility modals such as may are plural 
distributive indefinites for worlds, i.e. analogous with some.  
 
  Universal quantifiers quantify over a contextually available domain, while existen-
tial quantifiers introduce entities into the domain. The conditionnel on its would have to-
type reading requires an implicit or explicit restriction over worlds in the same way that 
all apples in (24a) requires either an implicit or explicit restriction over individuals; the 
conditionnel on its should-type reading introduces worlds into the discourse in the same 
way that some apples in (24b) can introduce individuals into the discourse. It is for this 
reason that both universal determiners and the conditionnel on its would have to-type 
reading are infelicitous in out-of-the-blue contexts. 
 
(24)  a. All #(the) apples are on the table.  
  b. Some apples are on the table. 
 
  As discussed for example (22), we are not introducing just any set of worlds into 
the discourse, but certain worlds in particular. Here is the trick I want to propose. Sup-
pose that the should-type reading of the conditionnel is indeed a plural indefinite, but in 
fact a specific plural indefinite. A nominal specific indefinite introduces a specific set of 
individuals into the discourse. Similarly, a specific indefinite for worlds introduces a spe-
cific set of worlds into the discourse. 
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  Nominal specific indefinites also have the property of speaker-listener epistemic 
asymmetery. It has often been noted the speaker must have a specific referent in mind (cf. 
(25b)), but the specific indefinite is licit even if the listener cannot recover it, as in (25a). 
 
(25)  a. I’m going to buy some (particular) CDs. It’s a surprise, so I can’t tell you which.  
b. I’m going to buy some (particular) CDs: one of Brittany Spears, one of Feist, and 
one of John Coltrane.  
 
  This proposal has a precedent in work by Rullmann, Matthewson and Davis (2009) 
on St’at’imcets, a language in which the same modal is glossed with either universal or 
existential force, depending on context.
5 
 
(26)  lán-lhkacw       ka        áts’x-en  ti     kwtámts-sw-a 
  already-2SG.SUBJ DEON see-DIR  DET husband-2SG.POSS-DET  
  ‘You must/can/may see your husband now.’ (Rullmann et al. 2009: 12)  
 
The authors argue that in fact all modals in the language are specific plural indefinites. 
On analogy with Kratzer’s (1998) analysis of nominal specific indefinites, a contextually 
determined choice-function h selects a subset of worlds in the domain (i.e. modal base). 
If the choice-function selects a proper subset of worlds, the interpretation is existential. If 
the choice-function selects an exhaustive subset of worlds (i.e. the identity function), the 
interpretation is universal.  
 
  The idea for the French conditionnel is that it varies in the same way. In addition to 
an empty modal base f and totally realistic ordering source g, the conditionnel is evalu-
ated relative to a contextually-determined choice-function h (type <st,st>). In would have 
to-type interpretations, the choice-function selects an exhaustive subset; in the should-
type interpretations, the choice-function selects a proper subset of worlds. 
 
(27)  [[COND φ]]
f,g,h,w is defined iff 
(i) modal base f is “empty” 
(ii) ordering source g is “totally realistic” 
(iii) h is a choice-function 
(iv) h(g(f(w))) ⊆ f(w) 
          If defined,  
  [[COND φ]]
f,g,h,w =  1 iff ∀w' ∈ h(g(f(w))): [[φ(w’)]] = 1 
 
3.3 Conditionnel Journalistique 
 
We have discussed two interpretations of the conditionnel with an embedded modal: a 
would have to-type interpretation with universal force and a should-type interpretation 
with the force of a specific indefinite. If the conditionnel indeed varies according to a 
choice-function h, we would expect it to vary in this way even in the absence of an em-
                                                 
5 I am not making any claim about the expression of notional ‘should’ in St'at'imcets. 
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bedded modal. As it turns out, there is reason to think that it does. Consider (28) which 
has not only a would reading, but also a reading something like (although we shall see not 
the same as) an evidential. 
 
(28)  Le président arriverait aujourd’hui.  
  a. ‘The president would arrive/be arriving today.’  
  b. ‘Apparently the president will arrive/ is arriving today.’  
 
  I will refer to this second interpretation as the journalistic conditionnel (JC) because  
it is often (but by no means exclusively) found in news reports. The most salient feature 
of the JC is the non-commitment of the speaker to the truth of the prejacent. Dendale 
(1993) offers the following continuation is appropriate in (29a), it is rejected following 
the variants with modal devoir (on its epistemic reading) (29b), and with the non-modal 
present (29c).  
 
(29)  a. JC  
Les militaires de Buenos Aires seraient fort contrariés de la tournure qu’a prise 
l’affaire. Vraie ou fausse l’annonce de leur  réaction est signicative de…  
‘Military personnel in Buenos Aires are (apparently) strongly against the turn of 
events. True or false, the announcement of their reaction shows that...’  
  b. Devoir ‘must’  
Les militaires de Buenos Aires doivent être fort contrariés de la tournure qu’a prise 
l’affaire. #Vraie ou fausse, l’annonce de leur réaction est significative de...  
‘Military personnel in Buenos Aires must be strongly against the turn of events. 
#True or false, the announcement of their reaction shows that ....’  
  c. Indicative  
Les  militaires  de  Buenos  Aires  sont  fort  contrariés  de  la  tournure  qu’a  prise 
l’affaire. #Vraie ou fausse, l’annonce de leur réaction est significative de ...  
‘Military personnel in Buenos Aires are strongly against the turn of events.  #‘True 
or false, the announcement of their reaction shows that...’ 
 
  Further, although the JC is often discussed as an evidential, unlike most evidentials,  
it is felicitious even when the prejacent is known to be false, as shown in the attested  
examples (30) and (31) from Dendale (my glosses).  
 
(30)  Ce matin la flotte britannique aurait quitté le port de Portsmouth. Le gouverne-
ment  britannique a déclenché ainsi le compte à rebours pour la guerre des Malou-
ines.  
‘This morning, the British fleet apparently left the port of Portsmouth. The British 
government thus launched the countdown to the War of the Falklands.’  
(31)  Je réfute fermement sa suggestion selon laquelle l’action gouvernementale  
  serait influencée par des considérations électorales. 
‘I strongly reject his/her suggestion, according to which government action is sup-
posedly influenced by consideration of elections.’ 
 
In this respect, the JC behaves like other interpretations of the conditionnel. The prejacent 
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may or may not hold in the actual world. In our terms, the JC has an empty modal base 
with a totally realistic ordering source. 
 
  The JC is also felicitous in out-of-the-blue contexts and is often used this way in  
news reports. Like the should-type interpretation of the conditionnel, the JC does  
not require an explicit or accommodated secondary criterion (e.g. if-clause), in this case a 
set of report/belief worlds. 
 
(32)  Q: Qu’est-ce qui se passe? ‘What’s happening?’  
  A: Le président arriverait.  
      ‘The president is apparently arriving.’  
      # ‘The president would arrive.’  
 
We will say that the choice function h picks out a subset of worlds, namely those worlds 
in which the source of the report is reliable, from the empty modal base. In the case of 
‘should’, the speaker can, but need not, make explicit the propositions which characterize 
the worlds. In the case of the JC, these worlds are distinguished by the source of the re-
port. In (33), the source of the report is not explicit. To make the source explicit, we use a 
selon or d’après ‘according to’ phrase, as in (34).  
 
(33)  Il pleuvrait.  
        (Apparently), it will rain.’  
(34)  D’après les prévisions météo, il pleuvrait (mais j’en doute).  
  ‘According to the weather forecast, it will rain (but I doubt it).’  
 
4. Final Remarks 
 
It remains to be seen whether an analysis similar to the one sketched here can be ex-
tended to languages other than French and English, or whether this is even desirable.  
Due to considerations of space, I most also leave unanswered several questions, including 
the (un)availability of scoping between the conditionnel and an embedded modal, what if 
any constraints exist for the contextual parameter (i.e. choice-function) h and a discussion 
of other flavors of modality. What should be clear, however, is that the conditionnel in 
French and preterite modals in English are, despite previous assumptions to the contrary, 
and modulo important discourse properties, best analysed as modals embedded under a 
counterfactual operator. 
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